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"The Constitution is intended to meet and to fit the amazing physical, economic, and social
requirements that confront us in this modern generation. ,, - Franklin D. Roosevelt

Introduction
In 2008, the global financial crisis exploded onto the world stage highlighting the modem
conditions of globalization, financial interconnectedness, and economic vulnerability. The speed
and the intensity of the global financial crisis have resulted in sweeping legislation challenging
existing legal constraints and setting continuous constitutional challenges. This interaction
between economic crisis and constitutions, applied through the lens of the current global
financial crisis, highlights the strengths and shortcomings of certain constitutional designs.
In this paper we will analyze two different constitutional frameworks; those granting
general and specific rights. Generally, the United States Constitution is a charter of negative
rights, which grants general rights rather than specific rights, and allows the Supreme Court to
fill in the gaps. 1 Thus, individual fundamental rights are implied through the liberty provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.2 Whereas the constitutions of Portugal and
Greece have a positive charter, that provides for specific individual rights, especially socioeconomic rights. 3 Although the intensity of the crisis and the availability of resources of each
country vary wildly, each has been dealing with the same basic issues and challenges within their
respective legal constraints. In particular, each country is required to balance the good of the
state or the collective public interest against the rights and hardship of individual citizens. This
plays out in the call for budget reductions and the corresponding cuts to services and salaries. In
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Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court S Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative
Perspective, 6 chap. L. Rev. 137 at 139, 151 (2003).
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Kende, supra note 1 at 139, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the U.S., because specific individual rights are absent, the balancing is left to the legislature4 and
therefore the main constitutional challenges focus on the legal scope of the federal government's
power. In contrast, the constitutional challenges in the Eurozone focus on the infringement of
individual social and economic rights and the struggle to implement austerity policies and severe
budget cuts. The resulting constitutional challenges led to a finding that U.S. courts played a
near non-existent role whereas the Eurozone courts Europe, played a much greater role.
Part I of this paper will discuss the constitutional history of the United States concerning
the court's role during the New Deal, where the Supreme Court was able to alter its
interpretation of Due Process without the benefit of a formal constitutional amendment. 5 This
change of interpretation ushered in a new framework of judicial review that allowed greater
deference to the legislature when regulating the economy. 6 Furthermore, this paper will discuss
and analyze the ability the U.S. government to manage the current global financial crisis within
its existing constitutional framework, and in particular explore the lack of constitutional
challenges to TARP and its implementation.
Part II will examine the case of Portugal, where the implementations of austerity policies
have been hindered by the Portuguese Constitution. 7 The Portuguese Constitutional Court, after
first upholding austerity measures valid on the basis of emergency economic circumstances, has
constantly invalidated austerity measures as repugnant to the individual rights embodied in the

4

Kende, supra note 1 at 152. {"The Supreme Court has made clear the legislative and executive branches should
resolve socio-economic rights issues.")
5
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1973, 1973 (1990).
6
Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70
Fordham L. Rev. 459, 464-46 (2001).
7
See Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. no. 396/2011; see also Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.]
Rul. no. 353/2012.
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Portuguese Constitution. 8 This judicial activism has threated Portugal's access to credit markets
and a fragile economy still recovering from the recession.
Part III will examine the case of Greece, which has suffered the harshest consequences of
the global fmancial crisis. Due to the severity of the existing crisis the Greek courts have upheld
austerity measures even though these measures infringe on individual rights guaranteed by the
Greek Constitution.9 The lack of constitutional protection of specific rights and the
disintegration of the standard of living has led to widespread violent protest throughout Greece.
Part IV will include a comparative analysis of the differences between general and
specific constitutional framework; and additionally compare the opposite outcomes reached by
the Portuguese and Greek courts concerning substantial similar issues of austerity. Furthermore
we will examine the ability of the United States, through its legislature, to balance the need for
deficit reductions and individual socio-economic rights. Finally we will conclude that in the
specific case of economic crisis the United States constitutional framework, its experience, and
the role of its legislature have allowed the U.S. to most successfully adapt and balance the
pressing issues presented by the global financial crisis

I.

THE UNITED STATES

"Our Constitution is a charter ofnegative rather than positive liberties ... The men
who wrote the Bill ofRights were not concerned that government might do too little for the
people but that it might do too much to them. " -Judge Posne/ 0

8

See td. See also Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. no. 399/2010.
See Panagiotis Sotiris, Greece: The EU-ECB-IMF austerity package and the challenge for the Left, Greek Left Rev.,
July 15, 2010 available at http:/Jgreekleftreview.wordpress.com/2010/07/15/greece-the-eu-ecb-imf-austeritv9

package-and-the-challenge-for-the-left/.
Kende supra note 1 at footnote 2. citing Jackson v. Citv of Joliet. 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
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The Great Depression and Great Recession are two episodes in the U.S. constitutional
story that pushed the constitutional limit of the federal government's ability to intervene in the
economy. During the Great Depression the Supreme Court was seen a substantial roadblock to
recovery and the implementation ofNew Deal Legislation. In a series of landmark decisions
between 1935 and 1936 the Supreme Court invalidated major federal and state regulatory
legislation based on theories of "liberty of contract" and a limited federal government. 11 By
1937 the Supreme Court reversed itself and held federal and state regulatory legislation
constitutional. 12 This change in judicial review altered the existing constitutional interpretation
without the requirement of a constitutional amendment and allowed the government to directly
manage the existing emergency crisis and the economy. 13
The Great Depression and the New Deal
The Wall Street Crash of 1929 marked the beginning of the Great Depression which saw
the disintegration of the national economy. 14 When Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his
inaugural address in March 1933, the nation's unemployment rolls listed thirteen million idle
workers or one quarter of the work force. 15 From 1930-33, five thousand banks had failed,
eliminating nine million savings accounts, and half of the nation's income. 16 The average man's
desire for food and shelter put enormous stress on the political system. 17 The Roosevelt
administration pledged a "New Deal" to combat the desperate economic condition by passing
emergency legislation. 18 By increasing the government's role in the economy, New Deal
11

William G. Ross, When did the "Switch in Time" Actually Occur?: Re-Discovering the Supreme Courts "Forgotten
Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 Ariz. St. LJ. 1153, 1153-54 (2005).
12
Ross, supra note 11 at 1154.
13
Lash, supra note 6 at 459-60.
14
Ross supra note 11 at 1153-54.
15
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1973.
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Id. at 1977.
ld. at 1974.
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legislation challenged the existing constitutional orthodoxy of limited government 19 and
conventional judicial notions of substantive economic due process.20 In order to permit
economic reform the court had to alter its current constitutional interpretation.21 To this effect,
the Supreme Court was able in a very short period of time to make a doctrinal revision
abandoning substantive economic due process and the liberty of contract principal?2 In the end,
the Supreme Court redefined due process and established a new constitutional framework that
expanded the federal government's ability to intervene in the economy during economic crisis.
i) Emergency Power Doctrine
Even prior to the New Deal legislation, states passed moratoriums on foreclosures in
response to the emergency economic situation that provided relief to struggling debtors. The
moratory statutes were challenged by bankers and lenders as a violation of the Contract Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.23 The Contract Clause states that "no state shall enter into any ... Law
impairing the Obligation ofContracts.24 Home Building Loan Association v. Blaisdell25 was the
first case where the Supreme Court upheld the use of the emergency power doctrine outside the
context of war. 26
In 1933, threatened by foreclosures, farmers rioted in Minnesota and petitioned the state
legislature for protection. 27 In response, Minnesota passed a moratory statute that delayed
foreclosure sales and extended redemption periods beyond the dates of foreclosure specified in

19

G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal In Time The Supreme Court Reborn: The
Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt. By William E. Leuchtenburg. New York: Oxford University Press.
1995. 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1392, 1393 (1996).
20
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1987.
21
1d. at 1974.
221d.
23

Home Building Loan Association v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398,399-400 (1934)
U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1.
25
Blaisdell. 290 U.S. at 400.
26
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1988.

24

27Jd.
5

the individual mortgage contracts.28 The statute authorized Minnesota courts, upon application
by the mortgagor, to extend the existing one-year period of redemption from fore-closure sales
for such time as was deemed equitable and further the duration of the law was limited to either
two years (March 193 5), or if the emergency ended, whichever came first. 29
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that to the extent that the statute interfered with
contractual obligations, there was justification based on the state's police power responding to
the interest of a public economic emergency. 30 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and upheld the
statute despite the fact that it violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution based on the
emergency power principal.31 The Court craved out conditions in which a valid exercise of
emergency power existed; the legislation must be for the protection of a basic interest of society,
the character of the relief was appropriate to the emergency, the conditions on which relief was
granted were reasonable and the legislation was temporary being "limited to the exigency which
called it forth. " 32
Blaisdell has been described as representing the dawn of "living Constitution"
jurisprudence. 33 Its majority opinion34 embodied the notion that the Constitution should adapt to
changing circumstances. 35 It also exemplified the ultimate sovereign right of self-preservation
which could neither be defined nor circumscribed by a formal constitutional clause. 36 As Robert

28

Blaisdell. at 416-418.
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1988.
30
Blaisdell. at 419-20.
31
Id. at 437. (Court held that "the economic interest of the state may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts.")
32
1d. at 444-47.
33
Lash, supra note 6 at footnote 100. See Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal, 108 Yale L.J. 2165, 218687 (2000).
34
Written by Chief Justice Hughes.
35
Lash, supra note 6 at 479.
36
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1999.
29
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Jackson famously wrote, "The Constitution is not a suicide pact" douse the flames first; then
repair the bad writing. 37

ii) Due Process
Congress enacted Roosevelt's recovery plan, known as the first one hundred days of
legislation, to lift the economy from its purgatory.38 The extraordinary New Deal legislation
challenged the constitutional orthodoxy of limited government and the traditional interpretation
of due process, which embraced the liberty of contract.39 During the half-century preceding the
Depression, the Court has decided to equate the personal liberty promised by due process with
unfettered enterprise and expanding the concept of property to a degree that limited government
regulation. 40 Although the "liberty of contract" is not an express constitutional right, the
Supreme Court embraced the freedom of contract as a liberty protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment41 in Lochner v. New York. 42 Based on this interpretation
of due process the Supreme Court had broadly rejected both federal and state attempts to regulate
the economy and provide for the welfare ofworkers. 43 Between 1935 and 1936 the Supreme
Court invalidated a number of key aspects of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, based on
Lochner's "liberty of contract," economic substantive due process, and a limited interpretation of
the Commerce Clause.44

37

ld. at 2000.
Lash, supra note 6 at 476.
39
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1999.
40
ld.
41u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42
Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). (Lochner involved a New York state statute that limited the hours of
any bakery employee to no more than sixty hours in one week. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute and
held that the statue limiting hours of labor "interferes with the right of contract between the employer and
employees ... and the general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.") Id. at 53.
43
ld. at 459-60.
44ld. at 476.
38
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In early 1935, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Railroad Retirement Act
(RRA) in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railway Co; 45 the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA) in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp,46 and the Frazier-Lemke Act. 47 In 1936 the Court
struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a new coal labor code in Carter v. Carter Coal
Company, 48 and New York's minimum wage, 49 which upheld the court's previous ruling in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital. 50
As the Supreme Court invalidated core provisions of Roosevelt's legislation, many
believed that the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, barred escape from the
Depression. 51 The popular conception at the time was that the government should participate in
a regulatory capacity in the economy. 52 Charles Beard, a Constitutional historian, wrote that the
time had come for "the ruling ideas, appropriate to the age of tallow candle and ox cart," to be
modernized to comprehend "economic interests ... [that] have been advancing with electric
speed under the impacts of technology and organization."53 Others viewed the Court's

45

Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railway. 295 U.S. 330,344-46 (1935). (The Railroad Retirement Act (RAA)
established a federally administered compulsory retirement and pension system for all carriers. The law required
present and future employees to make contributions to the retirement fund. The Court held that the RAA violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and stated that the "act denies due process of law by taking the
property of one and bestowing it upon another. The Court further found that the RAA violated the Commerce
Clause.)
46
A.L.A. Schechter Poultrv Coro v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). (The Live Poultry Code was written and promulgated
by the Roosevelt administration in 1934 under the NIRA. The code fixed the maximum number of hours a poultry
employee could work, imposed a minimum wage, and banned certain methods of unfair competition. The
Supreme Court invalidated the act because it was an unconstitutional grant of legislative power to allow the
president to write new codes as long as they regulated "unfair competition," reasoning that "unfair competition"
was too ambiguous to constitute a "intelligible principle." Secondly the Court found that the act violated the
Commerce Clause because Schechter's activities where entirely intrastate.)
47
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 2001. (The Frazier-Lemke Act, amended the Bankruptcy Act permitting debtors to
effect composition of their debts by forcing creditors to relinquish security. The Law was applied retroactively and
permitted extensions up to ten years.)
48
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
49
See Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo. 298 U.S. 587 (1936}.
50
Adkins v. Children's Hosp.. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
51
Hulsebosch supra note 5 at 1976.
52
ld. at 2004.
53
1d. quoting C. Beard & G. Smith, The Future Comes 169-70 (1933).
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interpretation of due process clause, as "the last and most formidable entrenchment of privileged
wealth." 54 Additionally this sentiment was captured by the popular press, which wrote:
"What we need now is martial law: this is no time for civil law. The
President should have dictatorial powers. The edicts of the Constitution
do not interfere with a general when he is fighting a battle; and the
Constitution should not interfere with the remedies which are essential to
get us out of this appalling depression." 55
Others, placed the blame on the Justices themselves, in a book before he joined the court Robert
Jackson wrote that ''the immediate difficulty was with the Justices, not the Court of the
Constitution." 56
In 193 7, in an effort to clear constitutional hurdles, Roosevelt had submitted his court
packing plan, 57 and Congress itself was considering a number of constitutional amendments. 58
Both proposed plans were rendered moot when the Supreme Court, and in particular Justice
Robert, changed its interpretation of due process, which effectively abandoned Lochnerian
doctrine and allowed the New Deal to proceed. 59 The switch is generally regarded as having
occurred. with the Supreme Court's legitimating of Washington State's minimum wage in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,60 which overruled Adkins and a fifteen year old precedent to the
contrary. 61 Parrish, ushered in an entire new method of judicial review that granted great

54

1d. quoting I. Brant, Storm Over the Constitution 242 (1936).
ld. at 1978 quoting Madadden, "This is War," Says General Pershing, Liberty, June 25, 1932, at 4, 4.
56
Lash, supra note 6 at 475 quoting Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 70 (1941).
57
President Roosevelt proposed to increase the Court's membership by adding one justice for every Supreme
Court justice over the age of seventy to ensure favorable treatment of New Deal Legislation. Hulsebosch, supra
note 5 at footnote 31.
58
Lash, supra note 6 at 476-77. (Proposed Amendments fell along two main lines; those which sought to
restructure the nature of judicial review, for example by providing for a congressional override of judicial opinions
and those which sought to increase the regulatory power of government by permitting regulation of labor and the
economy.)
59
1d. at 460.
60
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
61
White, supra note 20 at 1415.
55
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deference to legislatures when regulating the economy. 62 The Court reconstituted due process in
a manner that allowed the legislature to make policy and since the Court's decision in Parrish,
not a single regulatory law has been struck down as beyond Congress' commerce power. 63
Due to the flexibility of the U.S. Constitution by granting general rights, the Supreme
Court was able to alter the shape of judicial review and in doing so the interpretation of due
process without the benefit of a formal constitutional amendment. 64 President Roosevelt's
critique that "we have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce"
had been overturned,65 and the shift can be considered a "rebirth" in which the American
constitutional system adapted to modemity. 66

Thus, the U.S. government was armed with the

tools to implement legislative solutions to economic problems confronted by a modem world.
Great Recession
"This is the financial equivalent ofwar and we are going to need wartime power. " Hank Paulson Secretary of Treasure to President George W. Bush.

The global financial crisis came to a head in 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
but its roots stem back to the real-estate bubble and the collapse of the market for mortgage
backed securities. 67 The U.S. real-estate bubble was created by inflated housing prices fueled by
a rapid rise of subprime lending68 and the packaging of mortgage back securities. 69 Subprime

62

Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 2016.
Lash, supra note 6 at 478.
64
ld. at 464-46.
65
Lash, supra note 6 at 479.
66
White, supra note 20 at 1392.
67
Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, & Matthew S. Johnson, The Origins of the Financial Crisis, Fixing Finance SeriesPaper 3, at 7 (2008}.
68
Subprime loans (or mortgages) are loans to unqualified buyers. Prior to 2000 subprime lending was nonexistent, but the sustained rise in the housing market and the bundling of mortgages made subprime lending
lucrative and attractive. This increase in lending led to more demand for new houses which in turn led to an
oversupply of housing on the market growing the real estate bubble. Additionally, many of these loans included
63
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mortgages were "securitized"70 by being pooled together with prime mortgages into
"packages."71 These packages were sold to financial institutions that used these pooled
mortgages to back other financial instruments,72 which were sold to investors all over the
world. 73 As financial institutions made huge profits creating and selling these instruments, easy
monetary policies and low interest rates created an incentive for financial institutions to borrow
large sums of money to finance the purchase of more mortgage-backed securities. 74 The
increased borrowing led to a high level of financial leverage on the fmancial books of investment
banks, which multiplied profits but also exposed them to greater risk if real-estate prices were to
fall. 75 When the housing bubble finally burst, the value of securities tied to the real estate
markets plummeted inflicting severe instability on the entire financial system. Lehman Brothers,
due to its massive property investments, saw its stock price free fall, and was forced to file
bankruptcy. 76

i) TARP
The fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers threatened the stability of the entire
banking system. As the breakdown in the banking system and credit market spread throughout
the economy, the United States was inflicted with the worst economic crisis since the Great

forms ~f predatory lending. For example, borrowers had poor credit histories and banks used attractive mortgage
incentives such as no down payments, teaser rates, or postponed interest payments to increase lending. ld.

691d.

°Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed these "mortgage-backed securities" to ensure their marketability.

7

ld.

7lld.
72

Also known as collateralized debt obligations (COOs). These COOs were then sliced into tranches by degree of
exposure to default or risk and sold to investors depending on their appetite for risk. The Origins of the Financial
Crisis: Crash Course, The Economist, Sep. 7, 2013.

73Jd.
74Jd.
75

Baily supra note 73 at 7-8.

761d.
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Depression.

77

The symptoms were substantial; foreclosures were at an all-time high, real estate

values plummeted, businesses scaled down, unemployment exploded, the DOW plummeted, and
consumer spending and confidence were shaken. 78

In response, Congress enacted the

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which created the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP). 79 The purpose ofTARP was ''to immediately provide authority and
facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the
national financial system."80

At its heart, TARP granted significant authority to the Secretary81

to spend $700 billion to remove distressed assets from the financial banking system, which in
essence allowed the government to infuse a large amount of capital into the economy for the
purpose of stabilizing the market. 82
Courts have yet to address any constitutional challenges to T ARP, 83 but many groups84
have asserted its unconstitutionality. The principal constitutional issue rests on the claim that
TARP is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and violates the non-delegation
principle. 85 The crux of the argument rests on the fact that legislative power is constitutional
vested in Congress 86 and Congress may not delegate away that power to another branch of

n Erik D. Klingenberg, Summary and Analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 62 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 26
(2008).
78

1d.

79

Stephen Smith, Standing up to Nothing: Why TARP Has Not Become a Constitutional Case, at 515 (2011).
80
12 U.S.C.A § 5201(1).
81
TARP authorized the Secretary "to purchase ... troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and
conditions as are determined by the Secretary." 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211. The act further states that such authority
must be exercised in a manner to protect the value of personal investments, minimize foreclosures, boost the
economy, maximize the return on investment, and provide accountability to the public. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5213.
82
Smith, supra note 85 at 515-16.
83
Cases that have challenged TARP's constitutionality have been dismissed for lack of standing. See Texans Against
Governmental Waste and Unconstitutional Governmental Conduct v. U.S. Dep. of Treas .• 619 Supp. 2d 274, 275276 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
84
FreedomWorks Organization challenged TARP's constitutionality.
85
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 {1991).
86
Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests "all legislative powers herein granted" in Congress. U.S. CON ST.
art I §1. Further in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress has the power to "regulate
Commerce." U.S. CONST. art. I §8 cl. 3.
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government. However the non-delegation principle is not a ban on all Congressional
delegations, and is satisfied when Congress "lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. "

87

Therefore TARP' s constitutionality rests on whether Congress has satisfied the
"intelligible principle" requirement and provided a permissible scope of authority to the
Secretary. The "intelligible principle" analysis depends on factors such as the scope of
legislative authority granted, the power that is granted, and the constraints imposed on the
exercise of that power. 88 Here, T ARP grants the Secretary broad authority to purchase $700
billion worth of "toxic assets. " 89 The act places some restraints on the Secretary by stating that
the Secretary must exercise in a manner that "prevent unjust enrichment of financial
institutions,"90 "maximize overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States,"91 and
additionally consider the following factors; the value of personal investments, minimize
foreclosures, boost the economy, maximize the return on investments and provide accountability
to the public.92

An argument can be made that T ARP grants extraordinary broad authority to the
Secretary that impacts the entire national economy with only vague conditions on the exercise of
that authority. 93 Since the Great Depression the Supreme Court has generally interpreted the
"intelligible principle" test to allow broad delegations of powers, but due to the amount of money
involved combined with the lack of sufficient oversight make the bailout different enough from
87

J.W. Hampton. Jr.. & United States. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
.
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (The degree of agency discretion that is acceptable
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally confer.)
89
12
§5201(1).
90
12 U.S.C. §5211(e)
91
12
§5201(1)
92
12
§5213.
93
Freedom Works Foundation, Constitutional Infirmities of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
("ESSA"): A Legal Analysis from Freedom Works Foundation, No. 124 at 8 (2009).

88

u.s.c.

u.s.c.
u.s.c.

13

previous delegations. 94 In an interview concerning the bailout, Harvard Law Prof. Laurence H.
Tribe, stated "that any such challenge was unlikely to succeed because the doctrine of
Congressional delegation was significantly weakened during the New Deal and never
recovered. 95" Prof. Tribe further said that the bailout [TARP] "certainly tests the outer limits of
Congressional delegation authority," and "if the delegation were genuinely alive and well, TARP
might be among its potential victims." 96
The Obama administration in July 2009, went a step further when it used TARP funds to
assist automakers by purchasing their debts in a government-assisted bankruptcy restructuring. 97
This was done after Congress had effectively killed the Auto Industry Financing and
Restructuring Act of 2008, which would have gave Congressional consent for the auto bailout. 98
The purpose of the auto-bailout was to save millions of jobs at a time of economic emergency,
but it pushed the constitutional limits of federal power because T ARP was limited to apply only
to financial institutions.99 Thus it is argued that the Secretary illegally expanded the definition of
any financial institutions 100 to included car manufacturers. 101 Although there has been no court
ruling on the constitutionality of the bailouts, it is clear that the federal power exercised
represents the outer limits of a constitutional exercise of federal power.
Today, an unconstitutional decision would have little practical effect as it is unlikely that
the money spent could be recovered. However, the lack of an unconstitutional ruling

94

John Armey, Some Ask if the Bailout is Unconstitutional, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2009, at A16 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16challenge.html.
95 ld.

961d.
97

Smith, supra note 85 at 515.
Id. at 527.
9912 U.S.C.A. § 5211{a)(1}.
100
Although not exhaustive the EESA definition for financial institutions applies to "any bank savings association,
credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company." 12 U.S.C.A. 5205{5}.
101
Smith, supra note 85 at 526. (Note: that the money was actually paid to GM's and Chryslers' "financial" arm.)
98
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demonstrates the government's continued ability to enact recovery legislation. 102 This exercise
of federal power to regulate the economy is rooted in the constitutional experience from the
Great Depression. 103 The positive experience with the New Deal period of the active federal
approach to the Depression in the form of industrial recovery programs and regulation are partly
due to the idea and pragmatic reasons for not limiting the government's maneuvering room
during economic crises. 104 This experience combined with the flexible characteristic of the U.S.
Constitution has allowed for an existing constitutional framework to readily accommodated new
responses 105 to modern problems exemplified in the responses to the financial crisis.
II.

PORTUGAL
The global financial crisis, rooted in the U.S. subprime crisis, swiftly crossed the Atlantic

and mutated into the European sovereign-debt crisis. The sovereign-debt crisis describes the
disruption of credit markets where the weaker southern countries 106 of the Eurozone plagued by
high debt-GDP ratios were unable to borrow credit at sustainable rates. 107 The inability to
sustainably borrow credit forced these countries to seek bailout packages from the "Troika"
which included the international lenders, International Monetary Fund, the European Central
Bank, and the Europeans Commission. 108 Fearing an expansion of the crisis and a deeper
recession, European leaders had no choice but to provide emergency funds to the debt stricken
countries to safeguard the financial stability of the entire Eurozone. 109 However, the Troika

102

Xenophon Contiades, Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis A Comparative Analysis, 300 (2013).
For example the weak to non-existent constitutional constraints of the non-delegation doctrine are rooted in
the Court's New Deal rulings. ld.
104
Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1987.
105
For example the authorization of bailouts that nearly socialize the banking and auto-industry.
106
Commonly referred to as PIGIS; Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy, and Spain.
107
Contiades, supra note 113 at 219-220.
108
Aristidis Bitzenis, loannis Papadopoulos & Vasileios A. Vlachos, Reflection on the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis:
The EU Institutional Framework, Economic Adjustment in an Extensive Shadow Economy, Cambridge Scholars
Publishing. (2013) at 3.
103

1091d.
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conditioned these loans on the implementation of deficit reduction policies known as austerity. 110
These austerity measures or belt tightening included reductions of salaries and pension benefits
for public employees, cuts in public services and job cuts, retroactive taxes, and alterations in
collective bargaining.

111

The implementation austerity policies have created constitutional

issues in each country as they attempt to satisfy their obligations under the loan agreement or
Memorandum. 112
Portugal felt effects of the global financial crisis immediately in 2008. 113 After chronic
financial mismanagement, overspending, and a bloated public sector, the following two years
accompanied by low economic growth, and an exacerbated sovereign credit market provoked by
Greece's near financial meltdown. 114 In 2010, Moody's Investor Service cut Portugal's bond
rating down two notches as Portuguese debt exploded with a high debt-GDP ratio. 115 In April
2011, in an attempt to stabilize its financial situation, 116 Portugal requested a €78 billion bailout
package from the Troika. 117 On May 17,2011 the bailout agreement or Memorandum 118 was
signed by the Portuguese Government. 119 The Portuguese State agreed to the conditions set by
the Memorandum, which required a strong restructuring of social, economic, and financial
policy aimed at reducing public budget deficits. 120 The manifestation of the policy, imposed by
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the Memorandum and passed by the Portuguese legislature, challenges some of the most
fundamental principles embodied in the Portuguese Constitution.

121

Portugal's Constitution was written in 1976 after the socialist "Carnation Revolution,"
which rid the country of dictatorship and led to its democratization. 122 In an effort to turn away
from its past dictatorship, the Portuguese Constitution of 1796 ("Constitution") is one of the
strongest constitutions in Europe in regards to the protection of social rights. 123 The Constitution
"ensures the primacy of ... a democratic state based on the rule of law and open up a path
towards a socialist society. " 124 Additionally obliges the state to promote employment, move
toward free health and educational services and develop centers of rest and holiday for
workers. 125 In reference to the legal force of those rights the Constitution states; "The law may
only restrict rights, freedoms and guarantees in cases expressly provided for in the Constitution,
and such restrictions must be limited to those needed to safeguard other constitutionally
protected rights and interests." 126 The constitutional order guarantees social state, equality, labor
and social security as its core rights and freedoms, and the crisis has presented a challenge to
Portugal's core ideals and principals.

Court Decisions
Many of the first measures passed to manage the crisis were upheld based upon the
extreme economic situation threatening the country. Since the beginning of the sovereign debt
crisis, the Portuguese Constitutional Court ("Court") has been confronted with policies
1211d.
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conflicting with rights guaranteed by the Portuguese Constitution. 127 On the other hand the cuts
are necessary in order to access credit from the bailout. 128 In 2010 the first measures were
enacted to address the country's runaway deficits, when the Portuguese government
implemented a retroactive tax. 129 The Portuguese Constitution explicitly forbids explicitly
forbids retroactive taxation. 130 Upon review the Portuguese Constitutional Court upheld the
new tax on the grounds that it was merely retrospective and was necessary to accomplish
compelling fiscal objectives. 131
In the Constitutional Court's decision 396/2011, the Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of an extra tax 132 and a reduction of salaries 133 aimed at public employees. 134
The Court found that the measures were discriminatory because they targeted public sector,
which violates of the constitutional principle of equity. 135 However, the Court further found that
the measures were justified in the framework of the economic crisis and due to the overriding
interest of the public welfare in the state's ability to acquire new loans for the citizens' general
welfare. 136 Furthermore, the Court warned that the measures were justified so long as the
situation remained exceptional, time-constrained, within certain limits, and anything beyond
would be unjustified and therefore unconstitutional. 137 Thus in the Court's first two decisions
regarding austerity, the Court found that although the measures violated parts of the Portuguese
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Constitution, the emergency economic situation justified their constitutionality, albeit with
warning.
Since the Court's first two decisions, austerity measures that infringe on constitutionally
protected rights have been almost routinely struck down. In July of2012 the Court considered
two provision, Article 21 and 25, of the 2012 Budget Law. 138 Article 21 consisted of a salary
cut, based on the suspension of two subsidies in annual salaries in the form of a Christmasmonth (13th month) and a holiday-month (14th month) for public workers. 139 Article 25
concerns the suspension of the same subsidies but for pensioners. 140 The suspension provision
would only run for three years, 2012 to 2014, but would be a considerable; decreases in salary
up to 25% and a minimum reduction of 14% of pension value. 141 In response workers
challenged the provisions alleging that the articles violated four principals 142 of the Portuguese
Constitution. 143 In the Constitutional Court Decision 353/2012, 144 nine of the twelve judges
declared these provisions unconstitutional as violating Article 13 of the Constitution. 145 The
Court first found a violation of the principle of equity 146 due to the targeting of the public sector,
and then considered whether this discrimination was justified. 147 The Court noted the clear
temporal limits of the provisions, but also considered the substantial financial impact on the
lives of public workers pointing out that the cuts had a long and strong effect on the economic
138
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"stability" of citizens. The Court reasoned that because the reduction in salary of public
workers was so substantial and no similar reductions extended to the private sector, these
provisions are distinguished from those upheld in Const. Ct. Rul. 396/2011. 148 Therefore the
court held that the deliberate targeting of public sector workers with such an intense salary
reduction violated the equity principle. 149 However, the Court also considered the severity of
the financial situation and the need to satisfy the conditions of the Memorandum, and the Court
permitted the enforcement of the measures for the current budget year of 2012, but suspended
its effect for 2013 and 2014. 150
In the Constitutional Court decision 187/2013 handed down in April, 2013 the Court
struck down four austerity measures 151 introduced in the 2013 national budget law. 152 The
measures considered a tax on unemployment and sickness benefits, and cuts in wages and
pensions. 153 The Court again recognized the seriousness of the current financial situation and the
need to attain the public deficit goals included in the specific policy conditions laid down in the
Memoranda, however the Court reasoned that these measures went beyond the limits established
by the prohibition on excess where proportional equality is concerned. 154
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Following this pattern the Court again struck down parts of Portugal's revised Labour
Code, 155 in which the reforms were imposed by the terms of the Memorandum and officials from
the troika. 156 The reforms 157 attempted to make it easier for companies to shed workers and to
make the workplace more flexible by firing workers whose posts became redundant.

158

The

Court held that these measures violated guarantees of secure employment, 159 which prohibits the
firing of workers without just cause. 160 In particular he Court reasoned that the regulations in the
reform were too vague, and if left it up to the discretion of companies to decide on whether
layoffs are justified. 161 The Court further reasoned that "the law does not provide the necessary
regulation indications about the criteria that should be used by a company in deciding which jobs
should be cut," and stated that this "opens the door for arbitrary and legally uncontrollable
dismissals." 162 The Court further states that the key aspects of the article that gave the labor code
precedence over collective hiring agreements violate the constitutional right that protects unions
and collective bargaining. 163
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The Portuguese Constitutional Court and the Portuguese Constitution have placed a
substantial roadblock for legislatures attempting to reduce deficits and comply with the
conditions imposed by the Memorandum. Precedent set by the Court has fueled current fears
that important aspects of the 2014 Budget will also be invalidated. 164 In a recent statement by
Troika officials have identified challenges by the Court as potentially the biggest threat to
Portugal's effort to meet budget goals and to exit the bailout next year. 165 In 2014 the
government needs to cut the deficit to 4 percent of GDP down from 5.5 percent this year. 166 If
Portugal is unable to meet its budget goals it may hinder access to private credit markets and
require the application for a second bailout. 167 Alternatively a negative ruling on the 2014
budget would force the government to find alternative means of cutting spending to replace the
potential lost savings and achieve its budget goals. 168 The government's measures would likely
include tax hikes that could undermine a fragile economy recovering from a recession. 169 Thus
the problem imposed on policy makers is that deficit measures must comply with the Portuguese
Constitution and if they are invalidated, the result would restrict access to credit market requiring
a second bailout, or critical tax hikes to make up for the short fall in revenue, threatening

altered ... {3) Trade Unions have the competence to exercise the right to enter into collective agreements, which
right shall be guaranteed as laid down by law.
164
Axel Bugge, Portugal Budget vote to trigger challenges to austerity, Reuters {UK), Nov. 25, 2013, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/25/uk-portugal-bailout-idUKBRE9AOOHU20131125.
165 ld.
166

Bugge, supra note 176.
Constitutional Difficulties: A court ruling could force Portugal to seek a second bailout, The Economist, Apr. 13,
2013 available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576144-court-ruling-could-force-portugal-seeksecond-bail-out-constitutional-difficulties.
168
Bugge, supra note 176.
167

1691d.

22

recovery. 170 This precarious situation has moved the Prime Minister of Portugal, Mr. Passos
Coelho, to call to revise the constitution to slim down the welfare state. 171
III)

GREECE
The global financial crisis hit the Greek economy like a sledgehammer, and the intensity

of its effects are unmatched throughout the Eurozone, threatening bankruptcy and violent social
unrest. 172 The sovereign-debt crisis began in late 2009, when the Greek government announced
that previous reports on its official deficit were misleading. 173 Cooking the books combined with
severe public finance mismanagement 174 and tax evasion put the Greek economy into a death
spiral. 175 In December 2009, the country's credit rating was downgraded from A- to BBB+ with
a negative outlook. 176 The loss of Greece's market credibility caused investors to demand a
higher yield on Greek bonds, which increased the borrowing costs. 177 As credit markets dried
up, Greece was unable to borrow funds at a sustainable rate to service its debt obligations, and in
April2010 requested a bailout package from the Troika. 178 In May, 2010 Greece agreed to the
terms of the bailout and signed the "Memorandum," which required the implementation of
austerity measures to meet specific deficit reduction targets. 179 The bailout agreement with the
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Troika represented an aggressive restructuring plan to implement massive social and economic
reform.

180

The adoption of austerity policies has coincided with violent protests, a deep

recession, dramatic rise of unemployment, mass exodus of emigrants, rising suicide rate and
extremism. 181 Since 2008, the Greek economy has shrunk 23 percent and is expected to diminish
another 4.2 percent for 2013. 182 Even more distressing is Greece's unemployment, which has
tripled since 2008 nearing 30 percent, which is even worse among Greek youth and has exploded
to over 60 percent. 183
The main legislative piece of the first Geek bailout is Law 3845/2010, which
incorporated the terms of the Memorandum into Greek Law accompanied by severe budget cuts.
Law 3847/2010 created a reduction in the public wage bill by reducing the Easter, summer, and
Christmas bonuses and allowances paid to civil servants. 184 In order to access the credit under
the terms of the Memorandum the Greek government must meet certain deficit reduction targets
by additional rounds of budget cuts. 185 Under the terms of the 2011 bailout, the government has
until the end of2013 to move 25,000 civil servants into a labor reserve at reduced pay and the
likelihood oflayoffs. 186 Furthermore it is the first time under the Greek Constitution that public
sector workers will lose their jobs, with another 15,000 redundancies expected by the end of
2014. 187 Other constitutional provisions, such as the right to free university education will be hit
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hard by the layoffs. 188 By July, 2013 some 4,500 civil servants, mostly teaching staff, were
already redeployed or laid off, as four out of forty universities are shut down and other operating
half staffed. 189 With high levels of unemployment stiff resistance to the job cuts imposed by the
bailout conditions has resulted in violent protests across Greece centered in Athens. 190 By June
2013, 64 percent of Greeks opposed the government's latest austerity measures, putting strong
political pressure on the establishment as the ruling coalition struggles to avoid collapse. 191
In addition to violent protests the austerity measures has prompted constitutional
challenges to the introduction of taxes, enforcement of severe budget cuts, public sector layoffs,
and the reductions in pensions and salaries in the public sector that violate social rights
guaranteed by the Greek Constitution. 192 On these challenges, the Greek Council of State has
routinely upheld the legality of the austerity measures, due to the severity of the economic
crisis.

193

Court Decisions
The Greek Council of State, 194 in case 668/2012, upheld the austerity measures
prescribed in the first Memorandum, concerning budget cuts and reductions in salaries and
pension of the public sector by taking into account the need to serve the goals of general public
interest. 195 The Council reasoned that the principles of proportionality, equality, the fair
distribution of public burdens and the right to property were not infringed since the need to
service the country's external debt and the enhancement of its financial credibility were crucial
188
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to the public's interest. 196 The decision was largely based on the basis of Greece being in
economic need. 197
In 2013, the Greek Council of State in judgment 1685/2013 upheld an increased financial
contribution in taxes for annual incomes exceeding 60,000 euros. 198 It justified the measure due
to the need of protect the public interest and held that Law 3758/2009, did not violate the
constitutional restrictions, 199 permitting the retroactivity of laws that impose taxes only for the
year prior to their adoption. 200 Also in 2013, the Greek court justified additional cuts and layoff
to the public sector in accordance with the Memorandum. The Court held that the measures did
not to violate the principles of equity and the fair distribution of burdens and were justified by
the emergency state of the Greek economy.
Despite the Greek Council consistent of upholding austerity measures some Greek courts
have begun to control the policies implemented by the Memorandum. 201 In order to unlock the
next round of aid the Greek government proposed another round of austerity measures in the
2013 budget plan. 202 The austerity package included pension reform203 and the elimination of
annual bonuses for state employees. 204 The austerity measures were challenged before the Greek
Court of Auditors, which vets Greek laws before they are submitted to parliament. 205 In
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November of2012, the Court of Auditors declared these austerity provisions unconstitutional as
violating Articles 2,206 4,207 22,208 and 25 209 of the Greek Constitution, conflicting with
Constitutional obligation to respect and protect human dignity, principals of equality,
proportionality, and the protection oflabor.210 Although the Court's decision is not legally
binding on the Greek state, it opens the legal way to anyone who wants to challenge the proposed
cuts.211 Additionally Giorgos Kasimatis, one of Greece's foremost constitutional scholars, has
argued since the Court's first Memorandum ruling that the loan agreements violate the Greek
Constitution.212 Kasimatis states that "the decisions by the [Council of State] violates basic
tenets of justice" and further argues that ''the court did not examine whether the agreements
violate specific clauses of Greek law ... instead the decisions were based solely on the basis of
Greece being in economic need. This is a political decision and not a legal decision."213
Furthermore, Christina M. Akrivopoulou concerned with the legitimacy of the Greek
Constitution writes, "during the crisis the liberal, democratic Constitution of 1975 has lost much
of its ability to adapt to changing political conditions and according to public opinion it has
failed to provide Greek society with the necessary solutions to exit the crisis. For the majority of
Greeks, the present Constitution has lost its ability to effectively guarantee the freedoms and
rights of its citizens."214
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Thus in Greece, the Greek Counsel of State has remained consistently deferential toward
the legislature's budget cuts, upholding the austerity measures based on the emergency economic
situations.215 Interestingly however, the "Memorandum regime" has been accompanied by a
deterioration of the standard of living and the curtailment of constitutional rights which has
resulted in violent protests around Greece.2 16 This has created a dynamic situation where
although the Greek courts are deferential to the legislature, as Akrivopoulou writes, its
legitimacy is being undermined by not upholding the individual rights protected in the
Constitution.217
IV)

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION.
The U.S. has shown an enormous ability to adapt to the challenges imposed by the global

financial crisis. Considering the positive experience with the Great Depression, the federal
government has been allowed to make an extraordinary federal intervention in the economy
without significant challenges. Furthermore, because the U.S. Constitution confers general
rights we have seen the ability of the legislature to balance the needs of individual welfare
against budget cuts considerations.
The Supreme Court's decision in Blaisdell218 granted relief to debtors from foreclosure
under emergency circumstances. It allowed the government to alter the terms of an existing
private contract to serve a broader public interest despite being repugnant to the Contract Clause.
In the current crisis, foreclosures are rampant, and the Obama Administration granted foreclosure
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relief 19 and mortgage modification but did not rise to the extraordinary relief granted in
Blaisdell.

Furthermore, it did not rely on the narrower emergency doctrine to pass

constitutional muster, and allowed for the appropriate level of relief at the discretion of the
legislature.
Additionally, unemployment benefits have been extended since 2008, and now are
currently up for debate in Congress considering their extension.220 The lack of constitutional
right of unemployment benefits allows Congress to debate the issue and balance other policy
considerations. This example exemplifies the deference of granting economic relief to the
legislature allowing them to decided how long and how much without significant constitutional
challenge. Therefore the absence of judicial activism toward economic recovery legislation
allows for flexibility through the legislature to determine the best policy.
Comparatively, in the Eurozone we see two similar constitutional frameworks, Portugal
and Greece embodying specific individual rights, come to polar opposite conclusions on the
constitutionality of austerity measures. The balancing under the emergency doctrine of public
welfare, state interest, and economic emergency against specific individual rights and hardships
has led to different outcomes. In Portugal its constitution has become a significant roadblock to
austerity and reform and thus has threatened its acc~ss of credit, a second bailout, and increased
taxes; whereas in Greece the courts have so-far upheld the austerity measures based upon the
emergency situation.
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Thus because of the deference of Greek courts to its legislature it is an oversimplification
to argue that because of the U.S. constitutional framework and a lack of judicial activism toward
recovery legislation allows the U.S. to better manage an economic crisis. On the other hand, the
experience in Greece exemplifies the dangers of the emergency doctrine being used to undercut
guarantees of constitutional rights. In the U.S. a health legislative process has resulted in a
powerful check against such abuses. For instance, I argue that the foreclosure relief and
extension of unemployment benefits has reduced the sting of the recession and limited
extremism and violent protest. Whereas in Greece absent any relief to the citizenry has resulted
in violent protests.
A relevant Constitutional case has been played out in Detroit's recent bankruptcy
proceedings. The city of Detroit has been devastated by the Great Recession and with billions of
debt filed the largest bankruptcy proceeding in the United States history. 221 The relevant issue is
Detroit's contractual obligations toward the payments of the city pensions. 222 Union leaders and
pensioners claim that the city application for Chapter 9 is constitutional prohibited.223 The crux
of their argument is that Michigan's Constitution prohibits the modification of pensions, and thus
prohibits a Chapter 9 filing, which would all pension benefits to be altered through the
restructuring of the city's debt. 224 They further argue that because Michigan's Constitution
actually provides that pension benefits "shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not
be diminished or impaired" the state's Constitution invokes the federal Constitution's protection
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under the Contract Clause that prohibits the states from passing any law impairing contracts.225
In contrast city officials contend that the Bankruptcy Code, a federal law, overrides conflicting
state laws, through the Supremacy Clause. 226 On Dec. 3, 2013 a U.S. federal Judge Steven
Rhodes ruled that Detroit was eligible to reorganize under bankruptcy law despite Michigan's
Constitutional provision.227 Judge Rhodes said that although the city could cut pensions as part
of the restructuring, however warned that he will not rubber-stamp any pension cuts. 228

It is clear that the pensioners would have benefitted under the Portuguese or Greek
Constitutions, but a similar Portuguese Court ruling would have left the City of Detroit insolvent
and without the protection ofbankruptcy. 229 However, similar to in Greece, the federal court
ruling places a heavy burden on the citizenry especially the city's pensioners. Although in
Detroit, cutting pensions valued at around $19,000 would substantially limit the effects of the
safety net for many city workers, in Greece the intensity of the pensions cuts are much heavier
and has led to widespread poverty and hardship. 230 The difficult part is to balance between these
two results. Here, the federal government was able to provide Detroit with bankruptcy protection
and the ability to modify contracts, and allow a limited check on pension cuts.
In conclusion when considering the implementation economic legislation in an economic ·
crisis the U.S. government under its constitutional framework had the flexibility to best manage
the crisis. In particular, the case of Portugal showed how strong constitutional socio-economic
rights, can act as a substantial roadblock to recovery. On the other hand the case in Greece has
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shown the possible abuses of the emergency doctrine and the devastating effects from a lack of
relief.
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